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By J. WOODFORD HowARD, JR.*
I am privileged to pay tribute to Sidney Ulmer, who is rightly
honored for his leadership in building a strong department of
political science and for his many scholarly contributions to
judicial studies.
One character flaw of mine is the tendency to concentrate
on the sticky points while taking for granted points that are
good. The papers by Professor Fish and Professor Atkins have
so few sticky points that I am pressed for something useful to
say. So, after offering some constructive criticisms, I shall use
the papers as a springboard to larger themes about conflict and
consensus in judicial systems. I
At the outset, I should note what the two papers have in
common. Both share the central premise that different recruit-
ment systems do make a difference, first, in the types of judges
chosen and whatever that might mean for the theories of rep-
resentation and, second, intheir decisions-the policy outcomes.
Both authors also attempt to -relate background characteristics
to judicial behavior. Here, however, they differ. Professor Fish's
paper is a case study of a single, defeated nomination with an
accent on conflict. It is an excellent case study, perceptively and
beautifully written, using a traditional political model of selec-
tion. Our common teachers, Alpheus T. Mason and William M.
Beaney, stated this model succinctly: "The Supreme Court has
always consisted largely of politicians, appointed by politicians,
confirmed by politicians, all in furtherance of controversial po-
litical objectives. From John Marshall to Warren Burger, the
Court has been the guardian of some particular interest and the
promoter of preferred values."' Professor Fish clearly follows a
* Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.
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KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
political model of selection in contrast to the professional model
presented above.
The main pitfall of case studies is discreteness. How can
findings be representative in a microscopic study with such a
close focal length? Professor Fish rises above this problem by
comparing the failed nomination of Judge John Parker with
other nominations. He succeeds in what case studies should do,
yet often don't, i.e., suggesting hypotheses and generalizations
of wider application. In particular, I am impressed with the
emphasis on the political dynamics in these situations, the incen-
tives and disincentives facing the antagonists in deciding whether
to fight in another round. Professor Fish reminds us that all
sides of the fray calculate costs and benefits in terms of their
political capital, policy agendas, and prospects in the next elec-
tion. If an administration compromises on a candidate, for
instance, it risks giving an appearance of appeasing the opposi-
tion. Resistance to nominees, in turn, gets harder and harder to
mobilize against an administration's normal advantages. The
papers noted above contained additional evidence that these
dynamics are significant in most nomination struggles, not just
this one. So, I suggest underscoring this political dynamics theme.
The "spite nomination" concept, on the other hand, has
some problems. For one thing, President Richard Nixon did not
invent it. Raymond Moley used the same notion to explain why
the Roosevelt Court was so cantankerous and divided.2 The
tribunal of Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson was bril-
liant and scrappy. Sparks often flew. Individual expression was
so free that Chief Justice Stone once rebuked the brethren: "It
is not necessary to play every fly speck in the music." ' 3 Ironically,
President Roosevelt's oft-criticized packing of the Supreme Court
was soon condemned for atomizing it. Moley attributed this to
FDR's "purely political concept of the Court's function" and
to personal pique over losing the great Court-packing fight of
1937. Ostensibly conforming to customary criteria, Roosevelt
nominated southerner Hugo L. Black, westerner William 0.
Douglas, and Catholic Frank Murphy-all ardent New Dealers.
2 See J. HowARD, MR. JUSTICE MuRP'Y: A PoLITlCAL BIOGRAPHY 394 (1968).
3 A. MASON, HARLAN FsE STONE: PmLAR OF THE LAW 608 (1956).
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Revenge may have entered into these choices, but the main object
was surely ideological-integrating the federal judiciary into the
dominant lawmaking coalition, which every administration since
President Washington's has attempted.
In addition, I doubt that spite was the primary motivation
in the Carswell nomination. One can argue equally well that
President Nixon was vigorously pursuing his political goals. Nixon
had publicly announced his criteria. He wanted a southerner, a
Republican, and a strict constructionist (code words for going
slow on defacto desegregation); also a law and order judge (you
know what that means), and an experienced trial judge. If one
took Nixon's criteria seriously, the Carswell nomination was
predictable. In matching presidential purpose to recruit, as one
circuit judge said the week of the nomination, he was a "perfect
fit."
Less obvious, certainly to me, was that some of his colleagues
in the Fifth Circuit had politicked to get Carswell elevated from
a federal district court in Florida to the court of appeals and
from there to the Supreme Court. During interviews for my
study of courts of appeals, a circuit judge described how col-
leagues had arranged for Carswell to meet leading southern
Republicans during a weekend in Atlanta. His first nomination
apparently was harder to achieve than the second. Dean Lewis'
point about inadequate information is well-taken here. A lot of
us were fooled by the Carswell nomination. I confess that I
wrote Carswell a letter of congratulations. Given the sensitivity
of criminal justice issues and the doubtful caliber of other pros-
pects, I thought it made sense to place an experienced, former
U.S. Attorney and trial judge on the high court during a coming
period of consolidation.
My perceptions were second-hand and influenced by Car-
swell's judicial colleagues. Remember, the vast majority of fed-
eral judges in the Fifth Circuit, including Chief Judge Elbert P.
Tuttle, initially endorsed the nomination. There weren't many
southern Republicans to choose from. Attorney General Mitchell
had ruled out a distinguished one, John Minor Wisdom, as "a
damn left-winger. He'd be as bad as Earl Warren." '4 Carswell
4 Baltimore Sun, Dec. 14, 1969, at 12.
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enjoyed a rising regional reputation in the federal judiciary.
Colleagues had elected him as district-judge representative to the
Judicial Conference before his elevation to the court of appeals.
He also had a year's worth of experience deciding appeals as a
visiting judge by designation of the circuit leadership. The ABA
Standing Committee for the Federal Judiciary had rated him as
well qualified for the Fifth Circuit and endorsed him lukewarmly
as qualified for the Supreme Court. It is hard to believe that
these judges and lawyers knew about his early segregationist
speeches, his racial covenants, or his bullying civil rights lawyers
in his courtroom-the things that brought him down.
The point is that none of us did enough homework. It took
the hearings themselves and snooping by the press to expose
these shortcomings, whereupon Judge Tuttle retracted his en-
dorsement. Of course, Carswell was a lightweight. But we know
more now about his qualifications than we did then. I don't
believe that Carswell's nomination failed because of professional
mediocrity. It failed because of his past racism and because of
a false impression, partly from bungled testimony, that he lied
to the Senate Judiciary Committee about signing a racial cove-
nant as a U.S. Attorney.5 I hold no brief for Carswell, but to
interpret this case as rejection of mediocrity is a retrospective
reconstruction of past perceptions through a filter of his subse-
quent conduct and Senator Roman L. Hruskra's ludicrous ar-
gument that mediocrity, too, deserves a place on the nation's
highest court. In my view, Carswell's was not a spite nomination.
It was an ill-prepared, uncompromising pursuit of President
Nixon's southern strategy to recapture the region for the GOP.
This episode highlights one common thread in our discussion
thus far: Participants in the selection process don't always know
enough about candidates. Just as labor unions misjudged John
Parker and even William 0. Douglas in the 1930s, so a lot of
people, including presidential aides, fumbled Carswell's and other
nominations since for want of sufficient homework. The process
of discovery may be messy and at times excessive (Need we know
I See R. HAIms, DECISION 25-27, 41-71, 133-34 (1971), and George Harrold
Carswell: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-
12, 31-32, 68-72 (1970).
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Judge Bork's taste in video?). And individual reputations can
be needlessly harmed. Cloture, nonetheless, is hardly the remedy.
These failures teach the need for more, not less information.
What the "going-over" candidates may receive in public, on
balance, is a net gain for quality on the bench and the public
interest.
In any event, because the dynamics of struggle are the meat
of Professor Fish's paper, one other suggestion is to relate his
case study to what came out well above. These conflicts usually
peak at changing political tides, when presidents are challenged
and the judiciary itself is a target of contest. That was true in
the 19th century no less than in the nominations of Parker,
Carswell, or Bork. Only time will tell whether columnist James
Kilpatrick is right, as William Howard Taft was in 1920, that
the next president's opportunity to reshape the Supreme Court,
"is what matters most as the campaign moves inexorably toward
that high noon to come." '6
Professor Atkin's paper is a rarity, a comparison, as distinct
from a description, of selection to intermediate appellate courts
in different nations. The accent is on consensus rather than
conflict. It is a fine study in "prosopography," historical jargon
for collective biography, in which the analyst searches for com-
mon indicators of underlying values. The usual pitfalls of this
type of aggregate study are static and surface findings. Judges,
we are commonly ,told, are unrepresentative elites rather than
cross-sections of the community. That is hardly news in most
countries and inevitable where, by law or custom, judges must
be lawyers. This professional requirement alone excludes more
than ninety-nine percent of our civilian labor force. Sidney Ul-
mer wrote a fine piece in 1986 on the tendency of social back-
ground studies to be time-bound. 7 There are risks in studies
using social and economic characteristics as surrogates for more
dynamic processes of socialization by which lawyers and judges
learn their roles. Professor Atkins rises above these problems
first by expanding his model of recruitment to the English Court
6 Baltimore Sun, Sept. 7, 1988, at A.13.




of Appeal over time, and second by comparing results with
similar courts here. Both comparisons yield insights. I was stunned
to learn how impervious these all-male, upper-class tribunals are
to the social revolution that has swept England since World War
II. Professor Atkins also confirms the conclusion of Martin
Shapiro and others that the primary function of appellate courts
is a system maintenance. The common goal is to enforce the
supremacy and uniformity of national law.
Macro-studies like this, which have a longer focal length
than case studies, tend to be ambitious and abstract. They lack
the sex-appeal of a good nomination fight and may often raise
more questions than they answer. Still, I would like to plea for
the broader view of selecting judges that Professor Atkins' paper
represents. Our professions hold frequent conferences on judicial
recruitment and training, but their focus tends to be limited.
Recruitment usually boils down to war stories on how lawyers
get judgeships and evaluating various methods of picking them
in the final stage of selection. Neglected are the much longer
processes by which a large pool of eligibles is progressively
winnowed into a select few. Studying these processes should
reveal more about the judiciary than the intramural struggles
over who wins in the final round.
This is especially so if recruitment is linked to socialization.
Socialization in this context concerns educating lawyers for ju-
dicial work. Judges who assemble to consider this topic usually
discuss two forms of on-the-job training, either the adjustment
problems of newcomers ("freshman socialization") or their con-
tinuing education by doing ("occupational socialization"). Po-
litical scientists characteristically talk about judicial conflicts.
Thus, we focus on tips and cracks of the iceberg rather than
how the iceberg was formed. What needs more attention is
"anticipatory socialization" 
-the long-term educational experi-
ences by which "judges and co." acquire values and learn their
roles en route to office. I believe that a model of selection
expanded accordingly will improve understanding of the training
and values of judges, conflicts and consensus of courts, and the
way the few who judge relate to the many who are judged in
society.
Three interlocking processes-recruitment, socialization, and
professionalization-occur simultaneously in pathways to the
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bench. The American theory of training jurists is essentially
anticipatory. Judges are expected to learn their craft in the
process of achieving office. The code of the bench and bar is
that the better the advocate, the better the judge is likely to be. 8
This is opposite the French tradition where prospects opt early
for judicial careers and undergo formal training in a centralized
bureaucracy. The English practice is professional co-option,
though in the past, party service affected selections more than
Professor Atkins suggests.9 Successful candidates for judgeships
in the U.S. pass through several filters: professional, political,
and personal. Multiple screening has significant consequences.
For one thing, it underlies our endless debates over which method
of selecting judges-appointment, election, or some combina-
tion-is best. We seek professional competence, political ac-
countability, and personal qualities of fairness and integrity; but
various selection methods accent different goals, and we don't
agree about which should take priority. For another, overlapping
filters tend to weed out extremes. American judges tend to be
professional and political "moderates." Both sides commonly
assumed this in the fight over Bork's nomination. Being out of
the "mainstream" was enough to exclude him. Personal mod-
eration, indeed, may well be what people mean by "judicial
temperament."
Recruitment, moreover, is reciprocal. Lawyers must want to
be judges. Not everyone does. John W. Davis, the most eminent
constitutional lawyer of his day, declined a nomination to the
Supreme Court, saying: "I have taken the vows of chastity and
obedience but not of poverty."' 10 Because personal ambition
enters the equation, we can draw on a substantial literature of
vocational choice in social psychology to understand better the
reciprocal pull between personality and office.
Professor Atkins stresses the importance of recruitment and
socialization for the cohesion of intermediate appellate courts in
England. Consensus is their hallmark, not conflict. The same is
true for United States courts of appeals. How do we explain
- Letter from Charles Evans Hughes, Jr. to Harold R. Medina (May 19, 1947)
(available in Medina Papers, Princeton University).
9 See J. Giusrm, THm PoLrncs OF THE JUDICIARY 19-34 (2d ed. 1981).
o W. HARBAUOH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: TrE LIF OF JOHN W. DAvis 192 (1973).
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their relatively low dissent and reversal rates? Heavy caseloads,
routine error correction, and panel rotation all may be at work
in this country. Career paths of circuit judges also suggest that
an underlay of shared values and experiences may act as bonding
agents. For example, a plausible explanation for the Fifth Cir-
cuit's outstanding leadership on behalf of national values during
the desegregation crisis is that the majority of the judges had
already shaken segregationism and local allegiances in the pro-
cess of becoming eligible for appointment. Several of them had
been reared outside the region. Most had served in federal posts
or practiced law as representatives of regional and national
clients in urban centers of the new south. Their hides had
thickened against parochial pressures, so to speak, on their way
to the bench.
Collegial courts also develop traditions and norms to which
newcomers are expected to conform. Paul R. Hays of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit offers a good example. Hays,
a former Columbia law professor and labor arbitrator, had been
chairman of New York's Liberal Party before President Kennedy
appointed him to the Second Circuit. His conduct on the bench
was less liberal or activist than expected. When asked for his
conception of the permissible range of judicial lawmaking or
innovation, he replied that he shared the general attitude of his
court to apply the law as it stands. If Hays was "resocialized"
on the bench, he was not alone. This outlook has dominated
the Second Circuit for a long time. I am still fascinated by the
explanation that a distinguished southern jurist gave for the
different judicial styles then prevailing between the Fifth and
Second Circuits. In civil rights and criminal cases, he said, it is
hard for judges not to let visceral reactions determine the result
and then search the authorities for support. Commercial trans-
actions on which the Second Circuit concentrated, by contrast,
leave less room for "justice." Certainty and planning are higher
values when dealing with other people's money.
Professionalization surfaces here, too, though probably less
so than in England. Half of the circuit judges in my study had
served earlier on a federal district court. Not one of them,
including J. Skelly Wright, espoused an innovative view of a
judge's function. Politicians may complain with Fiorello La-
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Guardia: "It is queer what the bench will do to a man."'" But
Dean Lewis is right; the robe changes people. Political scientists,
in my opinion, underrate the significance of professionalism in
the American legal system. "The inscrutable force of profes-
sional opinion," as Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo put it, "presses
upon [judges] like the atmosphere.' 1 2 I think that is true. Just
as we criticized a purely professional model of selection pre-
sented above, so we should beware a purely political model
presented here.
In truth, we need to integrate both. After a long wrestle to
prove otherwise in three United States courts of appeals, I con-
cluded that professional and political ideologies of judges are
less polar opposites than overlapping value structures in keeping
with our selection methods and their public functions. This
melding of values and expectations undergirds judicial consensus
and makes it possible for the Supreme Court to guide the pre-
mises of decision in fifty-one legal systems in this country with
only one-percent review from the top. Our problem as scholars
is how to weave political and professional values into our models
in order to discern their influence.
In sum, I champion a broad view of judicial selection to
advance our common understanding of the judiciary. Choosing
judges involves more than picking winners in the last lap. It also
involves long-term processes by which jurists are trained and
integrated into courts as working institutions of government. A
broad view of selection, one that couples recruitment, sociali-
zation, and professionalization, should open windows of under-
standing at many levels. For one thing, it helps resolve tough,
micro-macro problems in social science of linking individuals to
groups of decision-makers and then to judicial systems and
whole countries. Professor Fish shows that case studies of indi-
viduals need not be discrete. Linking socialization with recruit-
ment also points out that judicial selection itself is not discrete.
It is a subset of a much larger subject in the study of leader-
" See J. HowARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE SECOND, F~mm, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIuRCUTs 168 (1981). Quote,
F. La Guardia, "The Garbage Tie-in Sales," P.M. (New York), April 7, 1946..
12 B. CADozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 61 (1924).
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ship-the fit of personality and office-which cuts across several
disciplines and literatures.
Professor Atkins demonstrates that social-background anal-
ysis need not be static. His study also suggests why a broad view
of selection is essential in understanding courts as institutions.
One difficulty with the "legal realist" model of judicial decision,
which so profoundly influences American academics, is the
premise that judges are soloists. Appellate judges in reality work
as members of groups. That condition perforce qualifies the
effects of individual values and escalates our need to comprehend
how collegial courts cohere. Studying the dynamics of career
development in pathways to the bench helps to solve the riddle
of judicial integration and independence. We see greater infor-
mal fetters on individual discretion and stronger sinews of co-
hesion, within and among courts, than statistics of formal review
and reversal might suggest. We find reasons for the continuity
of judicial institutions and styles over time, both in England and
the United States. We discover clues why regional law may
persist in tribunals whose official mission is nationalization. We
lay a basis for comparing the interplay of formal rules and
informal relations in different courts and countries over time.
A broad view of selection even connects to jurisprudence. In
current disputes over subjectivity in interpretation of legal texts,
Stanley Fish and other literary theorists tell us not to worry.
Structure comes less from formal rules than from informal roles
and shared values of the interpretative community.'3 Professor
Atkins' study of social backgrounds and recruitment suggests
why this apparently occurs in the English Court of Appeal. If
we meld political and professional values, as befits our overlap-
ping recruitment screens, a similar substructure likely sustains
the federal judicial system. Shared values, internalized by judges
en route to office and reinforced on the job, are the primary
glue that keeps our highly decentralized judiciary from flying
apart. Overlapping political and professional ideologies narrow
the range of judicial conflict and the aperture of essential Su-
preme Court review. A hierarchy of doctrine is maintained by
coordinating the "premises of decision" among trained workers
13 S. FISH, Is THRE A TEXT iN THIs CLASS? (1980).
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who exercise discretion in this interpr6tative community. A prime
function of review is to keep this vast system of informal roles
and expectations working. Precedents thus become bonds as well
as chains.
Herbert A. Simon, our leading organizational theorist, ob-
serves that the problem of organization is inextricably interwoven
with the problem of recruitment.' 4 People are more important
than machinery. Alas, it took me years of study to learn this
lesson. Sidney Ulmer understood the connection from the start.
That is just one reason why we gather here: he leads the pack
most of the time.
4 H. SimoN, ADmIN1smAniv BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
N ADmnsrATVE ORGANiZATiON xx, xxxvi-xxxvii, 220-28 (3d ed. 1976).
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